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Introduction 1 
 2 
The Theory of Reinvestment (Masters & Maxwell, 2008; Masters, Polman, & 3 
Hammond, 1993), Constrained Action Hypothesis (Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 4 
2001) and Explicit Monitoring Theory (Beilock & Carr, 2001) have been 5 
developed to explain the role of conscious processing in motor learning and 6 
performance. With respect to skilled performance, these theories propose that 7 
directing attention to movements can impair performance. The Theory of 8 
Reinvestment, which is the main focus of this paper, proposes that certain 9 
contingencies (e.g., psychological pressure, movement errors) can cause 10 
individuals to use task relevant knowledge acquired earlier in learning to attempt 11 
to consciously monitor and control automated movements, which can lead to 12 
impaired performance (Masters & Maxwell, 2008). For example, when preparing 13 
for an important putt a skilled golfer might attempt to consciously control the 14 
correct force with which to hit the ball, an aspect that may be better controlled 15 
automatically.  16 
An individual’s propensity for reinvestment can be quantified using the 17 
Reinvestment Scale (RS) (Masters et al., 1993) or a more recent scale that 18 
specifically relates to movement, the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale 19 
(MSRS) (Masters, Eves, & Maxwell, 2005). Both scales have been shown to 20 
identify individuals who are more likely to reinvest (Chell, Graydon, Crowley, & 21 
Child, 2003; Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy, 2006; Jackson, Kinrade, Hicks, & 22 
Wills, 2013; Malhotra, Poolton, Wilson, Ngo, & Masters, 2012; Masters et al., 23 
1993; Maxwell, Masters, & Poolton, 2006). Moreover, the scores on the RS have 24 
been shown to positively correlate with amount of task relevant knowledge 25 
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accumulated and negatively correlate with performance under pressure (Maxwell 26 
et al., 2006; Poolton, Maxwell, & Masters, 2004).     27 
Development of the MSRS revealed two factors, suggesting that 28 
movement specific reinvestment represents two different dimensions of conscious 29 
processing. Conscious motor processing reflects a tendency to consciously control 30 
the mechanics of movements, whereas movement self-consciousness reflects a 31 
tendency to monitor ‘style’ of movement (Masters et al., 2005). It has been 32 
proposed that movement self-consciousness describes conscious monitoring 33 
(conscious attention is directed to movements without an intention to control 34 
movements) and conscious motor processing describes conscious control 35 
(Malhotra, Poolton, Wilson, Omuro, & Masters, 2015). Jackson et al. (2006) made 36 
a conceptual distinction between two modes of conscious processing during 37 
movement, in which conscious monitoring of movement can occur independently 38 
from conscious control of movement. For example, under normal circumstances a 39 
golfer might monitor a certain aspect of movement (e.g., pay attention to the 40 
putter face angle), but following a missed putt she/he might attempt to control this 41 
aspect of the movement during subsequent putts (e.g., consciously attempt to keep 42 
the putter face angle square to the ball). Jackson et al. (2006) suggested that the 43 
degree to which either behavior occurs is dependent on the performance context 44 
and/or task complexity. 45 
Previous work by Malhotra and colleagues suggests that the demanding 46 
nature of a motor task is likely to determine when conscious monitoring and 47 
control occur. Malhotra, Poolton, Wilson, Fan, and Masters (2014), for example, 48 
found that movement self-consciousness was positively associated with 49 
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completion times of a relatively less demanding laparoscopic task1 during 50 
practice. On a more demanding laparoscopic task2 (cross-handed laparoscopy), 51 
however, conscious motor processing was positively associated with completion 52 
times. Additionally, Malhotra et al. (2015) found that when task demands were 53 
higher, in early-practice, both movement self-consciousness and conscious motor 54 
processing were positively associated with performance. However, later in 55 
practice when the task was presumably less demanding, movement self-56 
consciousness was positively associated with performance. Analysis of the 57 
underlying kinematic mechanisms suggested that individuals with higher scores 58 
on both dimensions of movement specific reinvestment displayed lower 59 
variability of impact velocity and putter face angle, which culminated in better 60 
performance. It was argued that a higher propensity for movement self-61 
consciousness potentially conferred superior ability to utilize exteroceptive and 62 
kinesthetic feedback to assess the discrepancy between actual and desired levels 63 
of performance (Schmidt, 2008), whereas, a higher propensity for conscious 64 
motor processing conferred superior ability to adapt movements to achieve 65 
success.  66 
One factor that could determine whether movement self-consciousness 67 
will positively (Malhotra et al., 2015) or negatively (Malhotra et al., 2014) impact 68 
performance is the situational context.  Participants in the Malhotra et al. (2014) 69 
study were medical students who may have placed high importance on looking 70 
like a surgeon when performing the laparoscopic task, and thus performed slower 71 
1 Laparoscopy is a minimally invasive surgical procedure that requires the insertion of surgical 
instruments through small incisions in the relevant area of the patient’s body (Hunter & Sackier, 
1993).  
 
2 Performance of the cross-handed laparoscopic surgery task was perceived as more mentally and 
physically demanding (measured using the SURG-TLX scale; Wilson et al. (2011) than the 
standard laparoscopic surgery task. 
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under high task demands. Conversely, participants who performed novel tasks in 72 
the Malhotra et al. (2015) study might have perceived the learning process as 73 
motivational, rather than demanding, which would explain the positive impact of 74 
movement self-consciousness on performance. 75 
Taken together, these findings suggest that movement self-consciousness 76 
can be evoked in both more and less demanding performance contexts, whereas, 77 
conscious motor processing is more likely to be evoked in situations that raise 78 
performance demands. There is very limited research, however, that has examined 79 
how the dimensions of movement specific reinvestment interact to influence 80 
performance under particularly demanding contexts like psychological pressure. 81 
For example, Huffman, Horslen, Carpenter, and Adkin (2009) examined the role 82 
of both dimensions in a pressure context. Inducing postural threat by asking 83 
individuals to stand on a raised platform evoked movement self-consciousness 84 
(concern for posture) and conscious motor processing (conscious control of 85 
posture), which resulted in changes in posture (i.e., leaning further away from the 86 
edge of the platform). Therefore, it might be expected that under pressure a high 87 
propensity to consciously monitor and control relatively well-practiced 88 
movements can disrupt performance by interfering with normally automated 89 
motor processes.  90 
The main aim of the current research was to further our understanding of 91 
how both dimensions of movement specific reinvestment influence skilled motor 92 
performance under demanding conditions. The two experiments presented in this 93 
paper examined the differential roles of movement self-consciousness and 94 
conscious motor processing in a golf-putting task under pressure (Experiment 1) 95 
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and in a quiet standing task under relatively low and high attention demands 96 
(Experiment 2).   97 
 Experiment 1  98 
In Experiment 1, we asked trained participants to perform a golf-putting 99 
task under a more demanding high-anxiety condition (i.e., financial incentive) and 100 
a less demanding low-anxiety condition. It has been suggested that overall 101 
performance outcome measures (e.g., hit or miss) might be too crude to reveal 102 
changes associated with conscious processing (Pijpers, Oudejans, Holsheimer, & 103 
Bakker, 2003) so kinematic measures were assessed alongside putting proficiency 104 
to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms that underpin each dimension of 105 
movement specific reinvestment. Movement variability was used as a kinematic 106 
measure to examine if a predisposition for movement self-consciousness and/or 107 
conscious motor processing leads to more or less consistent putting 108 
characteristics. Given that putting success on a flat surface is primarily determined 109 
by magnitude of force and putting direction, variability (SD) of impact velocity 110 
and putter face angle at impact (determines 80% of direction of putting stroke; 111 
Karlsen, Smith, & Nilsson, 2008) were chosen as the main kinematic measures 112 
(Malhotra et al., 2015; Pelz, 2000; Sim & Kim, 2010).3  113 
Overall, psychological pressure induced by the high-anxiety condition was 114 
expected to heighten levels of perceived anxiety and result in impaired 115 
performance. However, both Processing Efficiency Theory (PET) (Eysenck & 116 
3 Although recent research has discussed whether movement variability is functional or 
dysfunctional for performance (Bradshaw et al., 2009; Land & Tenenbaum, 2012; Lohse, 
Sherwood, & Healy, 2010), this is an issue that is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
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Calvo, 1992) and Attentional Control Theory (ACT, Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, 117 
& Calvo, 2007) propose that anxiety might also serve a motivational role, 118 
increasing the allocation of on-task supplementary processing resources (i.e., 119 
effort) that maintain performance effectiveness. While it is not entirely clear what 120 
these theories meant by ‘effort’ (Edwards, Kingston, Hardy, & Gould, 2002; 121 
Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996), allocation of additional processing resources to a 122 
task does not necessarily guarantee that performance is maintained under 123 
pressure; increased effort may lead to conscious motor processing as predicted by 124 
the Theory of Reinvestment, in which case performance should be disrupted 125 
(Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre, & Ring, 2010; Edwards, Kingston, Hardy, & 126 
Gould, 2002; Wilson, Smith, & Holmes, 2007). In order to understand the 127 
relationship between effort, movement specific reinvestment and performance 128 
under pressure, we also incorporated a measure of perceived effort in this study. 129 
Consistent with Malhotra et al. (2015), we expected that the less 130 
demanding, low-anxiety condition would evoke movement self-consciousness 131 
rather than conscious motor processing. Specifically, it was predicted that 132 
movement self-consciousness would be positively associated with putting 133 
proficiency. However, the high-anxiety condition was expected to evoke both 134 
movement self-consciousness and conscious motor processing (Huffman et al., 135 
2009). In particular, propensity to consciously monitor (movement self-136 
consciousness) and control (conscious motor processing) movements was 137 
expected to disrupt relatively automated movements.  138 
Kinematic measures were assessed on an exploratory basis and thus no a 139 
priori predictions were made with regard to these measures. A high propensity for 140 
consciously controlling movements (i.e. conscious motor processing) might lead 141 
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to ‘constraining’ (reduced variability) of the motor system (McNevin, Shea, & 142 
Wulf, 2003), such that high scorers on this dimension might display reduced 143 
variability of movements. Alternatively, if a high propensity for conscious motor 144 
processing leads to conscious control of movements (i.e., making adjustments to 145 
movements to achieve optimal performance), we might expect high scorers on this 146 
dimension to display greater variability of movements. Given our limited 147 
understanding of the mechanisms that underpin movement self-consciousness, it 148 
was difficult to make concrete predictions with respect to its relation to kinematic 149 
mechanisms.  150 
Methods4 151 
 Participants 152 
Thirty undergraduates (16 males, 14 females; age: M = 20.48, SD = 1.38 years) 153 
from The University of Hong Kong volunteered to participate in this study. All 154 
participants were novice golfers with no official golf handicap. Ethical approval 155 
for the study was provided by the Institutional Review Board and written 156 
informed consent was obtained from all participants. 157 
Apparatus 158 
Participants used a standard golf putter (length 89 cm) to putt golf balls to a 159 
standard size hole (10.80 cm) from a distance of 2 m. The experiment was 160 
conducted on an artificial indoor putting green with a hole located 0.72 m from 161 
the end of the putting green. Kinematics of the putter were acquired using a three 162 
dimensional ultrasound SAM PuttLab system (SAM PuttLab, Science Motion 163 
GmbH, Munich, Germany, www.scienceandmotion.de;Land, Tenenbaum, Ward, 164 
4 Portions of the data (learning trials) were used in a previous study (Malhotra et al., 
2015) 
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& Marquardt, 2013; Toner & Moran, 2011), which has an overall sampling 165 
frequency of 210 Hz. 166 
Psychological Measures 167 
Participants completed the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale (MSRS) 168 
before attending the training session. The MSRS comprises two subscales (5 items 169 
each) that assess conscious motor processing and movement self-consciousness. 170 
The movement self-consciousness (MS-C) subscale includes items, such as, “I am 171 
concerned about my style of moving” and the conscious motor processing (CMP) 172 
subscale includes items, such as, “I am aware of the way my body works when I 173 
am carrying out a movement”. Each item is rated on a 6 point Likert scale (1 = 174 
strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree) such that the scores range from 5-30 175 
points for each subscale. The MSRS has acceptable test-retest reliability and 176 
internal consistency: MS-C (r = .67, Cronbach’s α = 0.78) and CMP (r = .76, 177 
Cronbach’s α = 0.71).  178 
Effort 179 
The NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) is a multi-dimensional scale that has 180 
been used to measure workload in human factors research (Hart & Staveland, 181 
1988). It comprises six bi-polar dimensions that measure mental demands, 182 
physical demands, temporal demands, own performance, effort and frustration. In 183 
this experiment we only report scores from the effort dimension (i.e., how hard 184 
did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance?) Responses to the 185 
effort scale are made on a 20 point Likert scale anchored between very low and 186 
very high. 187 
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State Anxiety 188 
State Anxiety was measured using the short version of the State Trait Anxiety 189 
Inventory (STAI; Marteau & Bekker, 1992). This scale has acceptable internal 190 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.82).  The six item Likert scale (1= Not at all to 4 = 191 
Very much so) requires participants to respond to items like “I feel calm” and “I 192 
feel tense”.  Scores range from 6-24 points. 193 
 194 
Kinematic Measures 195 
The SAM PuttLab system was used to measure between-putt variability (SD) of 196 
putter face angle at impact and impact velocity for the low-anxiety and high-197 
anxiety conditions.  198 
Performance Outcome Measures 199 
Putting proficiency was measured on the basis of number of putts successfully 200 
holed in the low-anxiety and high-anxiety conditions.  201 
Procedure 202 
Participants completed the MSRS before attending two training sessions held on 203 
separate days. Participants were offered a financial incentive of HKD$1 per 204 
successful putt with an opportunity to earn a maximum of HKD$300, in order to 205 
keep the levels of motivation high throughout learning and as a precursor to our 206 
anxiety manipulation. On Day 1, participants completed 10 putts to familiarize 207 
themselves with the task after which they putted 20 blocks of 10 putts each. On 208 
Day 2, participants completed 10 blocks of 10 putts each. After completion of 209 
training, participants were informed about the amount of money they earned and 210 
then they were provided a 15 min rest and invited back for a testing phase. In the 211 
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testing phase participants performed 10 putts each in a low-anxiety and a high-212 
anxiety condition. In the low-anxiety condition participants were simply asked to 213 
try their best. In the high-anxiety condition participants were informed that it was 214 
crucial that they putted as accurately as possible as each missed putt would result 215 
in a loss of 10 percent of their earnings and missing all the putts would result in a 216 
loss of their entire earnings. The high-anxiety condition always followed the low-217 
anxiety condition (not counterbalanced) because it was expected that participants 218 
would be unmotivated during performance in the low-anxiety condition if it 219 
followed a condition linked to a financial incentive. 220 
Participants were required to complete the STAI scale after receiving the 221 
instructions and before making the putts in each of the anxiety-provoking 222 
conditions. Upon completion of the 10 putts participants were asked to complete 223 
the NASA-TLX scale.  224 
Data Analysis 225 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to assess the 226 
impact of anxiety conditions (low-anxiety and high-anxiety) on psychological 227 
(STAI and effort), putting proficiency (number of putts successfully holed) and 228 
kinematic (SD impact velocity and SD putter face angle at impact) measures, 229 
followed by separate univariate ANOVA’s for each variable.  230 
Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficients were conducted in 231 
order to assess the associations between the MS-C, CMP dimensions and putting 232 
proficiency, SD impact velocity and SD putter face angle at impact. Significant 233 
correlations were followed up by separate standard linear multiple-regressions.  234 
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The associations were checked for linearity and homoscedacity and a 235 
visual examination of standard scatterplots verified that there were no violations 236 
of these assumptions. Bivariate correlations of the two predictor variables (r = 237 
.580) suggested that they did not have a very strong linear relationship but to 238 
ensure that this correlation did not affect the regression analysis, collinearity 239 
diagnostics were calculated. The variance inflation factor and tolerance statistics 240 
indicated that the assumption of multi-collinearity was not violated. The data were 241 
checked for outliers using Cook’s distance and none of the cases were found to 242 
exert undue influence over the parameters of the model. 243 
Results 244 
The repeated measures MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate effect of   245 
condition (low-anxiety/high-anxiety), F(5, 25) = 7.91, p < .001, η2p = .61. Separate 246 
univariate ANOVA’s revealed a significant effect of condition on state anxiety, 247 
F(1, 29) = 16, p < .001, η2p = .36, effort, F(1, 29) = 9.86, p = .004, η2p = .25, and 248 
SD putter face angle at impact, F(1, 29) = 12.18, p = .002 , η2p = .30, but not on 249 
SD impact velocity, F(1, 29) =1.35 , p = .254, η2p = .05, or on putting proficiency 250 
F(1,29)= 0.94, p = .340, η2p = .03.  State anxiety scores were significantly higher 251 
in the high-anxiety (M = 14.20, SD = 3.74) compared to the low-anxiety (M = 252 
11.50, SD = 2.42) condition. Perceived effort was higher in the high-anxiety (M = 253 
12.87, SD = 4.61) compared to the low-anxiety (M = 10.97, SD = 4.40) condition. 254 
SD putter face angle at impact was lower in the high-anxiety (M = 1.16, SD = 255 
0.57) than the low-anxiety condition (M = 1.48, SD = 0.62). 256 
Descriptive data and Pearson’s correlation coefficients between MS-C, 257 
CMP and putting proficiency and kinematic measures are presented in Table 1. 258 
MS-C was positively correlated with putting proficiency (p = .016) and negatively 259 
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correlated with SD impact velocity (p = .041) in the low-anxiety condition but in 260 
the high-anxiety condition it was not significantly correlated with putting 261 
proficiency (p = .303), SD impact velocity (p = .334) or SD putter face angle at 262 
impact (p = .161). CMP was not significantly associated with putting proficiency, 263 
SD impact velocity or SD putter face angle at impact in the low-anxiety or high-264 
anxiety conditions (p’s > .05).  265 
 Given that the only significant correlations were between the MS-C 266 
dimension of movement specific reinvestment, and putting proficiency and SD 267 
impact velocity, multiple regressions were only carried out for these variables. 268 
Table 2 presents the model statistics, beta coefficients, t statistics and squared 269 
semi-partial correlations for the regression analyses predicting putting proficiency 270 
and SD impact velocity from MS-C and CMP during the low-anxiety condition. 271 
The overall multiple regression model for predicting putting proficiency in the 272 
low-anxiety condition explained 20.2% of the variance, F(2, 27) = 3.42  p = .047 273 
(see Table 2a). MS-C made a significant contribution to the model and uniquely 274 
explained 17.6 % of variance in putting proficiency, t(27) = 2.44, p = .021. Higher 275 
scores on the MS-C subscale were associated with greater putting proficiency. 276 
CMP made no significant contribution to the model, t(27) = -0.65 , p = .519. The 277 
overall multiple regression model for predicting SD impact velocity in the low-278 
anxiety condition was not significant, F(2, 27) = 3.01  p = .117 (see Table 2b). 279 
Discussion 280 
In line with previous studies, our experimental manipulation raised levels of 281 
perceived anxiety and effort in high-anxiety compared to low-anxiety conditions 282 
(Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre, Boardley, & Ring, 2011; Mullen & Hardy, 2000; 283 
Wilson, Chattington, Marple-Horvat, & Smith, 2007). However, anxiety had no 284 
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effect on putting proficiency. Although these findings are not consistent with our 285 
predictions, previous studies have found that anxiety doesn’t always impair 286 
putting performance (Cooke et al., 2011; Mullen & Hardy, 2000). Additionally, 287 
anxiety resulted in participants demonstrating lower variability of putter face 288 
angle but anxiety did not affect variability of impact velocity.    289 
Movement self-consciousness was positively associated with putting 290 
proficiency under low-anxiety conditions and there was a trend for it to be 291 
associated with lower variability of impact velocity. It has been previously 292 
suggested that movement self-consciousness may confer a state of heightened 293 
awareness in which individuals with a high propensity are better able to utilize 294 
feedback to assess current states of performance (Malhotra et al., 2015). 295 
Conscious motor processing was not associated with performance under low-296 
anxiety conditions. This is not surprising, given that reinvesting task relevant 297 
knowledge in the control of movements (i.e., conscious motor processing) is more 298 
likely to occur in situations that raise performance demands (for a list of 299 
contingencies that can cause reinvestment, see Masters & Maxwell, 2008), rather 300 
than in neutral situations (i.e., the low-anxiety condition in our study).  301 
Demanding contexts that emphasize the need to perform well are expected 302 
to evoke conscious control of movements (Huffman et al., 2009), but our findings 303 
revealed that conscious motor processing was not associated with putting 304 
proficiency or movement variability during the high-anxiety conditions. The 305 
Theory of Reinvestment (Masters & Maxwell, 2008) argues that anxiety 306 
provoking situations have potential to evoke conscious control of movements, 307 
which inadvertently leads to ‘deautomatization’ of the movement. Thus, the effect 308 
of conscious motor processing is more prominent for skills that are at least 309 
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partially automated (Deikman, 1966; Ford, Williams, & Hodges, 2005). 310 
Participants in our study might not have had partially automated movements. 311 
However, given that previous studies (Maxwell et al., 2006) have demonstrated 312 
the debilitative effects of reinvestment on golf putting performance following a 313 
similar number of practice putts this should not be the case. Another possibility is 314 
that the anxiety manipulation in this study was not severe enough to evoke 315 
conscious motor processing.  316 
Although the performance context might not have been demanding enough 317 
to evoke conscious control of movements, it might still be expected to encourage 318 
conscious monitoring of movements (Huffman et al., 2009), but our findings 319 
suggest otherwise. Movement self-consciousness was not associated with putting 320 
proficiency or movement variability under conditions that heightened anxiety. 321 
Why did the low-anxiety condition, but not the high-anxiety condition, potentially 322 
evoke conscious monitoring?   323 
In the current study, participants experienced increased levels of perceived 324 
anxiety and effort yet maintained their level of performance. These findings are in 325 
line with Processing Efficiency Theory (PET, Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and  326 
Attentional Control Theory (ACT, Eysenck et al., 2007), which propose that 327 
anxiety might also serve a motivational role, increasing the allocation of on-task 328 
supplementary processing resources (i.e., effort) to maintain performance. Thus, it 329 
is possible that the participants were left with no spare attentional resources for 330 
movement self-consciousness. It has been suggested that the act of ‘reinvesting’ 331 
can draw upon attentional resources of the working memory system; a limited 332 
capacity attention system that temporarily stores and manages information 333 
(Buszard, Farrow, Zhu, & Masters, 2013; Lam, Masters, & Maxwell, 2010). 334 
15 
 
Consequently, Experiment 2 sought to investigate the role of attention demands 335 
on movement self-consciousness.   336 
Experiment 2  337 
The findings from Experiment 1 suggested that raised levels of anxiety caused 338 
participants to allocate supplementary processing resources (i.e., effort) to the 339 
task, leaving them with few attention resources for movement self-consciousness. 340 
Experiment 2 was conducted to examine the role of attention demands on 341 
movement self-consciousness.  342 
Participants were asked to perform quiet standing on a force platform 343 
when attention demands were low (i.e., single-task condition) and when attention 344 
demands were high (i.e., dual-task condition). Dual-tasking was expected to make 345 
demands of working memory resources that were similar to the demands made by 346 
anxiety and effort.  347 
We employed a quiet standing (balance) task for two main reasons. First, 348 
the use of a fundamental movement skill, such as balance, ensured that 349 
participants would be equally competent at the task, without the need for lab-350 
based training. Second, a closed motor skill in which the goal is the movement 351 
itself was likely to evoke movement self-consciousness. The ability to balance is 352 
the basis of human movements and has commonly been regarded as one of the 353 
most automatic motor skills; however, research has revealed that this fundamental 354 
motor skill does indeed demand attention (Lajoie, Teasdale, Bard, & Fleury, 355 
1993). 356 
Consistent with Experiment 1, we expected that movement self-357 
consciousness would be positively associated with performance in the single-task. 358 
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Specifically, a high propensity for movement self-consciousness was expected to 359 
enable individuals to more effectively monitor their stance to ensure fewer 360 
movements. However, the dual-task condition was expected to consume working 361 
memory resources (in a similar manner to anxiety) that would normally be 362 
available for movement self-consciousness; consequently, we expected that 363 
performance in the dual-task condition would not be associated with movement 364 
self-consciousness. Performance of a fundamental movement skill in a non-365 
demanding environment was not expected to encourage conscious intervention in 366 
the control of movements. Hence, we did not expect conscious motor processing 367 
to influence performance in single- or dual-task conditions.  368 
Methods 369 
Participants 370 
Fifty-two healthy undergraduate students (27 males, 25 females; age M = 20.94, 371 
SD = 2.55 years) participated in the study for course credits. Ethical approval for 372 
the study was provided by the Institutional Review Board and written informed 373 
consent was collected from each participant. 374 
Apparatus 375 
A force platform (Zebris FDM-S 1.5, Medical GmbH, Germany; 55cm x 40cm x 376 
2.1 cm; 50 Hz sampling rate) was used to measure postural stability during quiet 377 
standing under single- and dual-task (tone-counting) conditions. The force 378 
platform was positioned approximately 1 m away from the wall. LabVIEW 379 
Application Builder 2010 (National Instruments Inc.) was used to create an 380 
application for the tone-counting task. The high-pitched (1000 Hz) and low-381 
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pitched (500 Hz) tones were presented in a randomized order with a frequency of 382 
1 s from speakers connected to a HP Pavilion laptop. 383 
Measures 384 
Similar to Experiment 1, participants were asked to complete the Movement 385 
Specific Reinvestment Scale (MSRS) before attending the study. It has been 386 
suggested that the use of multiple postural stability measures can complicate the 387 
interpretation of data (Fraizer & Mitra, 2008), so we examined only variability of 388 
center of pressure in medio-lateral (SDx) and anterior-posterior planes (SDy). 389 
These measures have been widely used as postural sway measures and have 390 
shown effects with regard to quiet standing performance under cognitive dual-task 391 
conditions (Riley, Baker, & Schmit, 2003; Riley, Baker, Schmit, & Weaver, 2005) 392 
and were automatically calculated by the software program (WinFDM).  393 
The tone-counting task required participants to monitor high- and low-394 
pitched tones and subsequently report the number of high-pitched tones presented 395 
during a 1 min period of quiet standing on a force platform. The tone-counting 396 
task has been shown to be sufficiently demanding and to hinder the use of 397 
working memory in controlling the primary motor task (e.g., Maxwell, Masters, & 398 
Eves, 2003; Maxwell, Masters, Kerr, & Weedon, 2001). 399 
Procedure 400 
Participants were required to perform two quiet standing tasks (60 s each) on a 401 
force platform. The instructions for the single-task condition were “Stand as still 402 
as possible”.5 Instructions for the dual-task condition were “Stand as still as 403 
possible and count the number of high-pitched tones”. The tone-counting task was 404 
5 We acknowledge that these instructions evoke an internal focus of attention, but the same 
instructions were given in the dual-task condition as well so we think this is of no consequence. 
18 
 
                                                          
introduced and practiced before participants performed the balance tasks. If 405 
participants’ responses varied by greater than +/- 5 tones from the actual number 406 
of tones presented, they were asked to perform the task again. None of the 407 
participants needed more than two practice trials.  408 
Data analysis 409 
Balance performance under single- and dual-task-conditions was compared using 410 
repeated measures MANOVA. Significant results were followed up by separate 411 
univariate ANOVAs. Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficients were 412 
conducted to assess associations between all measures. Separate standard linear 413 
multiple regression analyses were conducted to follow up significant correlations 414 
between movement self-consciousness (MS-C), conscious motor processing 415 
(CMP) and the performance measures. Statistical significance was set at p < .05 416 
for all tests. The assumptions of linearity, homoscedacity and multicollinearity 417 
were checked for violations. Cook’s distance was used to check the data for 418 
outliers. None of the cases were found to exert undue influence on the model. 419 
Results 420 
Overall tone-counting proficiency, computed as absolute percentage proficiency 421 
between the reported and actual number of high-pitched tones presented (Maxwell 422 
et al., 2001), was 97.8 (SD = 3.92). 423 
The repeated measures MANOVA of postural sway variables revealed a 424 
non-significant multivariate effect of condition, F(2, 50) = 4.11, p = .022, η2p 425 
= .14.  Follow up univariate analysis revealed that sway variability in the anterior-426 
posterior direction was significantly higher in the dual-task than the single-task 427 
condition F(1,51) = 7.25, p = .010. η2p = .13. There was no significant difference 428 
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for the sway variability in the medio-lateral direction between conditions, F(1,51) 429 
= 2.72, p = .105, η2p = .05. 430 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the performance measures and 431 
MS-C and CMP are presented in Table 3. The results show a significant 432 
correlation between CMP and MS-C (r = .56, p = .001). MS-C correlated 433 
negatively with single-task sway variability in the medio-lateral direction (r = -434 
.35, p = .012), but not with dual-task sway variability. No significant correlations 435 
were found between MS-C and sway variability in the anterior-posterior direction  436 
(SDy) and CMP was not significantly correlated with either of the sway variability 437 
measures in single-task or dual-task conditions (p’s > .05). 438 
Given that the only significant correlations were between the MS-C 439 
dimension of movement specific reinvestment and sway variability in the medio-440 
lateral direction in the single-task condition, multiple regression analyses were 441 
only carried out for these variables. The model statistics, beta coefficients, t 442 
statistics and squared semi-partial correlations for the regression analysis 443 
predicting sway variability in the medio-lateral direction in the single-task 444 
condition are presented in Table 4. The overall multiple regression model for 445 
predicting sway variability in the medio-lateral direction in the single-task 446 
condition explained 12% of the variance, F(2, 51) = 3.33, p = .044. MS-C made a 447 
significant contribution to the model and uniquely explained 8.8 % of variance, 448 
t(51) = -2.21, p = .032. Higher scores on the MS-C subscale were associated with 449 
lower sway variability in the medio-lateral direction. CMP did not significantly 450 
contribute to the model, t(51) = 0.14, p = .887.  451 
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Discussion 452 
The main aim of this study was to examine the role of attention demands on 453 
movement self-consciousness. The high levels of tone-counting accuracy 454 
suggested that participants complied with the dual-task instructions. Consistent 455 
with previous research (Shumway-Cook & Woollacott, 2000; VanderVelde, 456 
Woollacott, & Shumway-Cook, 2005), quiet standing performance was not 457 
affected by the dual-task.  458 
Movement self-consciousness was positively associated with quiet standing 459 
performance under the single-task condition. Participants with a higher propensity 460 
for movement self-consciousness displayed lower sway variability in the medio-461 
lateral direction. The anatomical makeup of the lower limbs results in greater 462 
sway variability in the anterior-posterior direction during quiet standing 463 
(Mochizuki, Duarte, Amadio, Zatsiorsky, & Latash, 2006) which might have 464 
made it easier for participants to monitor sway in the medio-lateral direction. 465 
When participants were asked to perform under the attention demanding dual-task 466 
condition, however, movement self-consciousness no longer influenced sway 467 
variability. These findings support the proposition that the lack of influence of 468 
movement self-consciousness under the high-anxiety condition in Experiment 1 469 
was due to the attention demanding nature of anxiety. Conscious motor processing 470 
has been shown to influence quiet standing performance in demanding 471 
environments (i.e., postural threat) that are likely to encourage conscious control 472 
of movements (Huffman et al., 2009), but in non-demanding environments it was 473 
not expected to evoke conscious control of movements and our findings revealed 474 
that this was the case. 475 
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General Discussion  476 
The Theory of Reinvestment is one of the established explanations for why 477 
performance decrements occur under pressure. The conceptual advancement of 478 
reinvestment (to movement specific reinvestment) has led to the emergence of 479 
two dimensions of personality that are expected to influence performance of 480 
different tasks and possibly under different circumstances. In Experiment 1, we 481 
examined the roles of the two dimensions of movement specific reinvestment in a 482 
more demanding high-anxiety condition (i.e., financial incentive) and a less 483 
demanding low-anxiety condition. Conscious motor processing did not influence 484 
performance under either low-anxiety or high-anxiety conditions. The influence of 485 
movement self-consciousness was evident in the low-anxiety but not the high-486 
anxiety condition. Experiment 2 was carried out to examine the role of attention 487 
demands on movement self-consciousness. 488 
Consistent with the findings of Malhotra et al. (2015), the results from 489 
Experiment 1 revealed that participants with a higher propensity for movement 490 
self-consciousness displayed greater putting proficiency in the low-anxiety 491 
condition. Although the anxiety manipulation in our study raised levels of 492 
perceived anxiety, it did not disrupt putting proficiency. In accordance with PET 493 
and ACT (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007), increased anxiety was 494 
accompanied by increased effort and maintained performance which suggests that 495 
effort probably depicted allocation of supplementary processing resources to the 496 
task. While researchers have suggested that increased effort may at times lead to 497 
conscious processing (Edwards et al., 2002; Eysenck et al., 2007), our findings 498 
suggest that such a process did not occur in this instance. Other factors, such as 499 
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the severity of anxiety or motivation, might determine when effort leads to 500 
conscious motor processing. 501 
In Experiment 2, participants were asked to perform a quiet standing task 502 
while concurrently performing an attention demanding dual-task. Movement self-503 
consciousness positively influenced performance on the quiet standing task in the 504 
single-task condition but its influence was diminished in the more demanding 505 
dual-task condition. While balance has been considered to be an automatic motor 506 
skill, there is some evidence to suggest that it does indeed require some amount of 507 
attention (Lajoie et al., 1993). A quiet standing task in which the goal is the 508 
movement itself was very likely to result in self-focused attention and possibly 509 
evoke movement self-consciousness. Given that the goal of the task was to 510 
consciously monitor movements (stand as still as possible) it is not surprising that 511 
participants with a higher propensity to consciously monitor their movements 512 
(high movement self-conscious participants) performed better. These findings are 513 
congruent with the acclimatization hypothesis (Baumeister, 1984), which suggests 514 
that individuals should perform better in situations that evoke their normal 515 
behaviour. In the dual-task condition, however, participants were no longer able to 516 
be movement self-conscious. The performance of a concurrent tone-counting task 517 
seemed to reduce the attention capacity available for movement self-518 
consciousness. Previous literature has suggested that reinvestment is an attention 519 
demanding process (Buszard et al., 2013; Lam et al., 2010) and this study lends 520 
support to this proposition, specifically with regard to movement self-521 
consciousness.  522 
Our study is not without its limitations. The anxiety manipulation in 523 
Experiment 1 did not disrupt performance. It is possible that training with a 524 
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monetary incentive might have evoked a certain level of anxiety that acclimatized 525 
performers to anxiety provoking conditions (Baumeister, 1984). However, this 526 
seems unlikely as participants reported increased levels of anxiety from low to 527 
high anxiety conditions. Researchers have raised concerns about the difficulties 528 
associated with evoking anxiety in laboratory settings that is comparable to real 529 
world settings (Williams, Vickers, & Rodrigues, 2002). Future work that 530 
examines the influence of the two dimensions of movement specific reinvestment 531 
on performance needs to be carried out in more ecologically valid settings. 532 
Although impact velocity and putter face angle at impact are the most crucial 533 
stroke parameters that determine putting success on a flat surface (Pelz, 2000; Sim 534 
& Kim, 2010), it is possible that they do not adequately reflect the processes 535 
underpinning conscious motor processing and movement self-consciousness. 536 
While some studies have been successful in identifying changes in movement 537 
patterns that may reflect conscious processing (Nieuwenhuys, Pijpers, Oudejans, 538 
& Bakker, 2008; Pijpers, Oudejans, & Bakker, 2005; Pijpers et al., 2003) others 539 
(Mullen & Hardy, 2000) have failed to do so. This remains an issue to be tackled 540 
by future studies. With regard to kinematics, another limitation is that the 541 
variability measure might have been somewhat confounded by performance as 542 
better performance may result in lower variability as a consequence of not 543 
requiring to correct movements. Similarly, in Experiment 2 we did not measure 544 
muscle activity during the quiet standing task, which might have provided more 545 
information about the mechanisms that underpin movement self-consciousness 546 
(Weinberg & Hunt, 1976).   547 
While previous research has shown that conscious control of movements 548 
can potentially impair skilled performance (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 549 
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2002; Gray, 2004; Masters et al., 1993; Maxwell et al., 2006), our results show 550 
that a high propensity for conscious monitoring of movements (not necessarily 551 
control) might be beneficial. Movement self-consciousness appears to be a 552 
desirable trait that is positively associated with performance on a variety of tasks; 553 
however, this only holds true in non-attention demanding contexts. Previous 554 
studies have implied that the propensity for movement self-consciousness is not 555 
immutable (Wong, Masters, Maxwell, & Abernethy, 2008), suggesting that it can 556 
be trained. A possible way to train movement self-consciousness could be through 557 
‘associative training’ (Shusterman, 2011; Toner & Moran, 2014) in which a 558 
performer is made aware of the proprioceptive feelings associated with different 559 
movements. Future work is required to empirically verify the effectiveness of 560 
associative training in sport contexts. 561 
 562 
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 Table 1.  
Descriptive data and correlation coefficients among all measures 
 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. MS-C 20.10 3.85           
2. CMP 20.47 4.02 .58** -         
 
 
Low-Anxiety 
 
            
3. Putting Proficiency 6.27 2.53 .44* .16 -        
4. SD Impact velocity 89.90 42.82 -.38* -.15 -.19 -       
5. SD Putter face angle at impact 1.48 0.62 -.29 -.30 -.38* .17 -      
 
 
High-Anxiety 
 
            
6. Putting Proficiency 6.70 2.02 .19 -.07 .44* -.10 -.31 -     
7. SD Impact velocity 82.07 38.04 -.18 -.11 -.21 .59** .29 -.30 -    
8. SD Putter face angle at impact 1.16 0.57 -.26 -.26 -.26 .25 .65** -.26 .39* -   
              
              
              
              
***p < .001, **p < .01, * p < .05 
MS-C, movement self-consciousness; CMP, conscious motor processing 
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Table 2.  
Multiple regression analysis predicting (a) putting proficiency and (b) SD impact velocity from MS-C and CMP during the low-anxiety condition 
 
  Variables β t sr2unique  
  Low-Anxiety     
a. Putting Proficiency MS-C 0.34 2.44* .18  
  CMP -0.09 -0.65 .01  
   Intercept = 1.24    
      R2 = .202 
      R2adj = .143 
      R = .450* 
b. SD Impact Velocity MS-C -4.81 -1.99 .13  
  CMP 1.07 0.46 .01  
   Intercept = 164.61    
      R2 = .147 
      R2adj = .084 
      R = .383 
***p < .001, **p < .01, * p < .05 
MS-C, movement self-consciousness; CMP, conscious motor processing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
Table 3.  
Descriptive data and correlation coefficients among all postural stability measures 
 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. MS-C 20.02 4.52       
2. CMP 20.52 4.16 .56** -     
3. SD of M/L sway, mm (ST) 21.28 13.32 -.35* -.18 -    
4. SD of M/L sway, mm (DT) 19.28 12.71 -.21 -.17 .78** -   
5. SD of A/P sway, mm (ST) 30.50 17.09 .04 -.01 .09 .14 -  
6. SD of A/P sway, mm (DT) 35.59 17.17 -.06 -.10 .15 .08 .68** - 
         
         
***p < .001, **p < .01, * p < .05 
MS-C, movement self-consciousness; CMP, conscious motor processing 
M/L, medio-lateral; A/P, anterior-posterior 
ST, single-task; DT, dual-task 
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Table 4.  
Multiple regression analysis predicting SD of M/L sway from MS-C and CMP in the (a) single-task and (b) dual-task conditions 
  
Variables β t sr2unique  
     
SD of M/L sway (ST)     
MS-C -0.36 -2.21* .09  
CMP 0.02 0.14 .00  
 Intercept = 40.90   R² = 0.12 
    R²adj = 0.08 
    R = 0.35* 
     
***p < .001, **p < .01, * p < .05 
MS-C, movement self-consciousness; CMP, conscious motor processing 
M/L, medio-lateral 
ST, single-task 
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